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The relations between the neurosciences and phenomenology enable us today, 
thanks to the works of M. Merleau-Ponty, G. Simondon, F. Varela, A.R. Dama-
sio and V.S. Ramachandran, to deﬁne the brain as a biosubjective organ: its 
constitution, its functioning, and its interactions prove that a description of 
individuation can ﬁt in a cognitive neurophenomenology. In this framework, 
the mental state acquires a subjective autonomy even if it is an illusion in regard 
to the determining conditions of the brain functioning.
Relations between phenomenology and the neurosciences, which 
appear to be impossible in principle, have now focused on the question 
of the “cognitive body.” This notion refers to the presence, in that part of 
organized matter termed the body, of intentional elements for organizing 
the treatment of information. Perception and action both belong to and 
work on this cognitive body. Now, the development of these two disciplines, 
phenomenology and the neurosciences, may have been independent and 
even antagonistic, but the description of the bounds between body and brain 
has now become an obligation for philosophy. In what she called “neuro-
philosophy,” Patricia Churchland (P.S. Churchland 1986) had proposed an 
eliminativist solution: the neurosciences would be suﬃcient to explain the 
constitution of the body by means of the natural basis of the brain, without 
any reference to phenomenology. 
I critiqued this type of reductionist reasoning because another de-
scription of the construction of the body is possible: the interaction of the 
body with its environment begins in the formation of the nervous system 
by the diﬀerent levels of plasticity (Andrieu, 1998). Neural plasticity is the 
experimental proof that determinism is not strict in the development of the 
body. Phenomenology performs the distinction between the lived body and 
the subjective body and at the same time enables a new description thereof, 
including biology and neurobiology.
The publication of the notes of Merleau-Ponty’s last lectures at the 
Collège de France between 1956-1960 (F. Evans, S. Lawlor eds., 2000) 
provides a new basis on which to launch a phenomenological approach to 
the relations between the body, the brain and the world. The 1957-58 lecture 
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on the concept of Nature examines the trends of modern biology. Coming 
back to this analysis of behaviour, Merleau-Ponty uses the book by G.E. 
Coghill, Anatomy and the problem of behavior in 1929, to set the principles 
of dynamic anatomy against strict behaviorism.
Strict determinism would have summed up nervous conduction to a 
univocal information. But after examination of the work on embryology, 
which belongs to the model of neurobiology of development (M. Reuter, 
1999, 73), Merleau-Ponty writes:
The nervous system emerges from a preneural dynamic. Thus when 
the nervous excitation occurs, it can’t play an important role in the 
organization of the nervous system. This organization is not so much 
due to the functioning of the neuron as to the growth of the total or-
ganism. The preneural system of integration “strides across” the nervous 
functioning and it doesn’t stop when it appears. So the nervous system 
can’t be the ultimate explanation. Then we must admit an intrinsic 
potentiality of growth, a dynamic system reacting to its surroundings 
as an organism would do. It replaces the function of conduction as 
being a consequence, not a principle of the system. (Merleau-Ponty, 
1995, 192).
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the reciprocal character of the notion of 
body and the notion of behaviour whereas A.R. Damasio (1999) sets it 
between the body and the brain.
In his last lecture, “Nature and Logos: The human body” (1960), 
Merleau-Ponty says the human body is the place where Nature emerges into 
ontological layers. The body is subject of movement and subject of percep-
tion. This theory of the ﬂesh formulates a coiling up of the body-object on 
itself, thanks to which it is touching/touched, visible/invisible. Thus the 
organism is not simply its psychochemical reality, because the ﬂesh of the 
body could be understood from the modes of constitution of the human 
body (A.F. Ashbaugt, 1978). The neurophenomenology (F. Varela, 1996) 
is a new perspective in the philosophy of embodied mind ( F. Varela, E. 
Thompson, E. Rosch, 1991).
The publication of Notes de cours conﬁrms how much Merleau-Ponty 
remained haunted by the link between biology and phenomenology (D. 
Borrett, S. Kelly, H. Kwan, 2000). His translation of and comment upon 
the Beilage XXII of the Krisis is the opportunity to ﬁnd in Husserl the in-
carnation of consciousness from biology.
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What I propose to call the ﬂesh (A. Ainley, 1997) of the brain deﬁnes 
the historic construction of the nervous system through the interaction of 
the body with the world and the progressive embodiment of these incor-
porations. To think the body which enables me to think the body. Vicious 
circle or badly put question? If we keep on distinguishing what enables us 
to think the body from the thought object, then we won’t be able to think 
the body thinking. For we must admit as man’s existential presupposition 
that without the body, there is no thinking; we must come back to the de-
scription of the internal relationships of the body with its thought in order 
to found dynamic materialism, but neurophilosophy (P.S. Churchland, 
1986) has popularized a strictly reductionist version (Andrieu B., 1998). 
I argue that we should instead have a philosophy of neuroscience (Gold, 
I. & Stoljar, D. 1999, 827) because there is an epistemological distinction 
between philosophy and neuroscience.
The role of interaction
The human body must be ﬁrst understood as in interaction with its 
environment because it is itself the receptive matter both informed and 
informing. The human body is not a monad but has a temporal character 
in phenomenology (Sara Heinämaa, 1999, 58). If isolated from the world, 
it is unable to build itself up, for nature has only endowed it with poten-
tialities that have to meet the circumstances of an environment to become 
actual. As an interface, the body doesn’t remain passive: it doesn’t obey the 
orders of the nervous system in a servile manner, neither is it an objective 
reﬂection of the world. Failing to be this recording chamber, according to 
the mechanical metaphor, the human body is the way in and out, through 
which the inside communicates with the outside (and vice-versa). This cross-
ing is subjectifying in the sense that the matter of the body is the result of 
this building up interaction. By “subjectifying” I mean the movement which 
singularizes each human body by successive incorporations. Subjectivity is a 
result, in continuous movement, of adaptation and regulation. The human 
body is subjectivized as soon as its conception by the mother and child’s 
interactions. Nothing completely objective can be known, thus making the 
knowledge of the world relative to each human body. Each one’s relativity 
doesn’t preclude scientists from approximately establishing a temporary 
truth on the human body.
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This knowledge remains approximate because of the very constitution 
of the body: the sensation is felt through the nervous structure in the body so 
that two human bodies can never feel the same intensity for the same object. 
Psychometrics, modernized by electrophysiology, quantiﬁes the quality of 
the experiences of what has been lived by the body: this method establishes 
an objective knowledge by measuring the times of reaction, the thresholds 
of perception. But the visualization of electric exchanges will never tell 
anything about the way the body feels them in itself. If neurosciences have 
a good knowledge of the body’s functioning, they describe the biological 
side as being felt psychophysiologically or even exclusively psychologically 
by the body itself. 
The distinction between levels of description does not lead to a new 
dualism since one could not exist without the other. Should the body owe 
its activities to the strict application of neuronal networks, nevertheless, 
the contents of the thought make the subject believe in a natural illusion 
of independence from the matter of his body. Our point is not to deny 
the determining character of matter in body functioning but to refuse the 
reduction of the organ to the function.
By the esthesiology of the body proper, two human bodies can never 
feel the same intensity for the same object. This impossible intersubjectivity 
holds the bodies (C. Lefort, 1991) out of themselves and each body in itself, 
making it diﬃcult to express linguistically what has been lived esthesiologi-
cally. The lack of objectivity is constituent of any human body’s relations 
with the world. At least any human body can be described from outside as 
an objective structure but the neurobiology of development must describe 
a process of subjective individuation rather than draw out a universal type 
of incorporation.
The notion of plasticity explains this adaptability of the human body 
to its environment, each body being a single body. So the body appropriates 
the information of its senses and the brain processes it. The brain is not the 
center of cognition but the necessary way to it. Does the physico-chemical 
transformation of nervous information presuppose a reduction of quality? 
The conversion of what is felt into nervous material is nonstop: the sum of 
the visual neurons produces the picture I see, the tips of my ﬁnger are nothing 
but the polished surface of the sensitive nerves. The human ﬂesh (D. Lever, 
1990) works at transforming and giving a deﬁnite shape to the physico-
chemical matter of information. The ﬂesh is proposed as a category, which, 
standing between soul and body, grounds the possibility of their relation (J. 
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Mensch, 1994). But for the description of the ﬂesh, we must go beyond the 
oppressive nature of binary terms, body and mind (D. Enns, 1995).
Which individuation?
The physical and scientiﬁc ‘dividuation’ is the opposite of what G. 
Simondon called the psychic individuation. In describing ontogenesis, his 
aim is to explain the individual through individuation. Thus individua-
tion is not an antecedent stage preceding the appearance of the individual 
being. Psychic individuation could be understood as a means of ﬁghting 
against the physical dividuation of the human body. For, by oﬀering the 
shapes, modes and degrees of individuation to replace the individual into 
the being, G. Simondon wants to renew the scattering of the being caused 
by the development of human sciences. They multiply psychism but do 
not manage to deﬁne the movement through which the individual comes 
out as a somato-psychic totality. Faced with the physical dividuation of 
the human body, psychic individuation would take into account, from a 
subjective point of view, the individual’s capacity to perceive, know and feel 
the world’s totality.
So, coming back to the Bergsonian opposition of time and space, Si-
mondon calls the physical individual what we have discovered as physical 
dividuation. By losing all dynamic balance, his individuality analyses and 
intervenes on physical elements but the individual can’t produce a suﬃcient 
activity to stop the reduction of psychic totality to his physical parts.
Psychic individuation, relevant to understand the genesis of the indi-
vidual, can’t resist physical dividuation. Simondon’s scientiﬁc model, used 
through notions of “potential,” “information,” “metastability” and “trans-
ductivity” still depends on a biological presupposition whose metaphorical 
limit was revealed by Jacob (1970). On the contrary, we think that if the 
individual has problems today with his identity and his unity, the reason is 
to be found in the change of an informative paradigm to a predictive and 
programmatic paradigm.
Negative induction or pathological reasoning
The study of dysfunctionings and other anomalies (P.J. Harisson, 1991) 
is very helpful in understanding the etiologic modes of the body. For interac-
tive individuation depends on the quality of the successive incorporations: 
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if the reception of incorporations is impaired, the body itself is modiﬁed. 
What is lacking for normal functioning is a guide for the description of the 
constitutions of the body.
Pathological reasoning shows the cause/eﬀect relation between this mat-
ter and these mental shapes. If destroyed or damaged, the physico-chemical 
matter of our sensitivity can’t provide the matter for thinking: or rather, there 
is a proportional ratio between the quality of sensations and the qualities of 
mental activities. The body provides the matter for thinking even if the way 
the thought pictures its mental states is perceived by it as independent.
This illusion of independence is well within the normal functioning of 
the thinking body but this partial autonomy of thought doesn’t prevent it 
from having the illusion of its independence. While writing these words, I 
don’t feel the direct determination of matter. Are we to conclude, as reduc-
tionists have it, that the content of the thought would be the strict application 
of the state of this matter? Is it because we don’t know how the brain really 
works that we keep the hypothesis of an independence of the thought or 
does the thought as result of the brain always produce for itself the illusion 
of this independence? I shall defend the second thesis, because the brain 
produces thought as extra activity whose causes are complex because of the 
number of networks involved.
Nobody can deny there is an element of determinism here: the slightest 
illness conﬁrms by a kind of negative induction the mutual implication of 
the body and the mind states; the experience of pleasure or pain proves how 
much the content of my thought can be invaded, even obsessed by the state 
of my body: thus the erotic image would be caused by hormonal excita-
tion, as some “biologies of the passions” claim (e.g. J.-D. Vincent, 1986); 
by “caused” we must understand that subjective imagination is oﬀered with 
this felt sensation the opportunity to be fanciful.
In the same way, the intensity of pain can be such that it forbids any 
autonomy of thought as if the body dominated and imposed its whole ma-
terial content on thought. Extreme pain or pleasure are moments when the 
continuity from body to mind is preserved almost in spite of us. Yet when 
we go beyond subjective control, it shows the permanent character of this 
continuity which we don’t feel in “normal” life. However the unawareness 
of the life of the body doesn’t put us out of the body.
Thus, imagination leans on biological conditions through humours. 
The state of the body acts upon the representation and the aﬀects by hor-
monal intensity. But the content of these dimensions of imagination isn’t set 
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in hormones, contrary to what reductionists who favour “brain medicine” 
put forward.
The distinction of diﬀerent levels of explanation acknowledges 
against dualism the necessary complementarity between the brain and the 
unconscious, but it poses the problem of the continuity between the two 
of them. We can’t recognize the determining role of biological processes 
without analyzing the nature and the limit of this determination. Refusing 
strict determinism because of the diﬀerence of level or organization 
of matter, our philosophy of the thinking body can’t expect science to 
exhaustively describe the functioning of mental states, on the one hand 
because of the disposition of organic networks, on the other hand because 
of the lack of an explanation for the change of quantity into quality. We 
must admit that the complex organization of matter products a superior 
level of reality, like in an emergence theory. This superiority, due to the 
results of network activity, seems independent if the mind observes this 
activity from itself whereas the superiority is just autonomous.
Mental autonomy 
This feeling, favoured by the experience of thought, of being out of 
the bod,y is actually a mental autonomy allowed by the functional coher-
ence of the body. The body keeps on ﬁnding in the contents of thought 
the modes of its representation of the world. It is not thought that thinks 
itself, or considers itself independent from the body. Mental states produce 
the “natural illusion” in Kant’s sense, of an independence of the mind from 
the body. By natural we mean that the mind is not conscious of it, and that 
the body is the cause of it.
However this continuity of oneself in one self doesn’t show a homoge-
neity in levels. Organic dysfunctioning proves that thinking requires certain 
neurobiological conditions to become conscious of the diﬀerent levels. For a 
long time, the criterion of the consciousness of oneself was considered as a 
limit beyond which there would be no thought: thinking should be reserved 
to the consciousness of the contents of one’s thought (C. Smith, 2001).
But, without going so far as hemispheric division whose purpose is to 
eliminate the concept of consciousness (the works on the split brain have as 
their therapeutic aim to prevent the spreading of epilepsy from one hemi-
sphere to the other, and they gave the opportunity to neurophilosophers 
(G.S. Stent, S.F. Spicker, 1990) to deny the mental unity of consciousness) 
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we must consider thinking less as a threshold in the cerebral organization 
than as the very activity of the body.
The notion of threshold, on this view, serves to retain of neurobiologi-
cal activity nothing but conscious intensity. But the body thinks conscious 
and unconscious contents from implicit or explicit perceptions. The crite-
rion of the threshold holds dualism where the corporeal matter organizes 
diﬀerent levels. The reﬂex should be understood as the natural unthought 
of the body itself. From reﬂex to mental representation, the distinction 
traditionally made between the voluntary and the involuntary is a criterion 
of the deﬁnition of the thought: what would be human would be set in 
the voluntary activity of the mind, thus oﬀering freedom and choice. Does 
acknowledging a determinism of the reﬂex prevent one from admitting the 
existence of an unconscious thought of the body? Isn’t the reﬂex a content 
of thought that we don’t think, a corporeal knowledge unthought out and 
yet determining?
The reﬂex is a material content unthought whereas reﬂection is a mate-
rial content wholly thought. The determinism of the one is necessary to the 
freedom of the other. Yet it is the same body even if the levels of organization 
of matter allow the presence or the absence of free activity of the thought.
How can one and the same matter (but is it the same matter?) produce 
within itself an unthought content and pure thought? We must admit that 
human matter has diﬀerent degrees of complexity according to which mental 
activity is more or less freed from strict natural determinism. Except probably 
for the reﬂex level, for which the body is subjected to natural determinism, 
all the other degrees of the organization of matter depend in their constitu-
tion on an interaction between nature and culture.
Thinking matter
The opposition between the innate and the acquired is renewed by 
cellular and molecular embryology which speciﬁes the conditions of the 
programmed development and the limited possibilities of plasticity. The 
matter of which the human body is made becomes the human body as 
successive incorporations take place (A.R. Damasio, 1994). This historical 
dimension of any human body is a psychosocial propping up: any learning 
requires a material support to be selected by living matter and thus be used 
as the informative basis for mental activity.
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This mental activity is autonomous for it is allowed by every human 
body according to the development of its history: the thought goes through 
the folds and layers of the subjective esthesiology and of the biopsychologi-
cal memory. The subjective esthesiology depends on the perception of the 
world, the latter being introduced into the body by the senses. Objective 
knowledge doesn’t exist as every human body must create for itself proto-
types built empirically.
Every thought is a coming back of the self to the self which results 
from the central nervous system going through the body: yet if it is true 
that every thought is an eﬀect of the thinking body, its contents are not the 
exact reproduction of the neuronal networks but their subjective produc-
tion. By subjective production we mean the eﬀect of neuronal networks 
inside the human body, historically built and with a material organization 
providing a speciﬁc mental activity: incorporation can’t be but subjective. 
Its materialization can’t be set in the brain. Cognitive activity is based on 
maps, networks, neurofunctional areas… rather than on single elements. 
The gregarious necessity of neuronal collections ensures the communication 
necessary to the autonomous activity of the thought. When we think, we 
are not aware of the neuronal networks which however are at work.
This unawareness of our brain gives thought an imaginary indepen-
dence as long as no damages limit or inﬂuence this activity. Mental states 
must be understood as forms crystallized at some time, chosen or not by the 
thinking body. The mental picture may as well come from mnesic recompo-
sition as from imaginary composition. It gives the thought its matter with 
representations of words or things. Yet no materiality could be grasped since 
the mental image is an immaterial form produced by matter, which seems 
paradoxical in a materialistic position. How could some matter produce 
something immaterial? Should the whole thing be diﬀerent and superior 
to the sum of the parts?
Maintaining a non-reductionist materialistic position presupposes that 
one allows for the creation of forms by matter—this position can be described 
as a dynamic materialism. Morphogenesis ﬁnds its reason and its dynamism 
in the matter of the genes of development. In the same way, couldn’t we 
describe mental states as an endogenesis of the matter of the thinking body? 
Through its networks, the brain produces the form of thought whose content 
is found in the connection and the conjunction of materials constituting 
the thinking body. The endogenesis of mental states is to a certain extent 
(the problem comes from this proportion) similar to the morphogenesis 
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described by embryology. The building of neuronal networks is submitted 
to equal biological constraints and the propping up structures of mental 
states. In order not to reduce the thought to the body, we must admit the 
body is materially able to produce not only organic forms (body states) and 
programmatic forms (children) but also ideal forms.
This endogenesis of ideal forms, as worked out by Gilbert Simondon, 
presupposes their crystallization into a mental state for the thinking body 
to be able to think them. This crystallization is the product, that we call 
reﬂection, of the real dynamics of matter. We must distinguish the subjective 
representation of the matter of the thinking body from the objective descrip-
tion of it. Not because the subjective representation would be erroneous or 
would not be able to know anything of the formal reality it has produced. 
Not because the objective reality of the idea of the thinking body would be, 
as far as quality is concerned, imperfect compared to the formal reality of its 
cause: the thinking body itself. But the mental state is a synthetic form of the 
material dynamics of the thinking body. Without this causality, it couldn’t 
exist, but conversely, without the mental state, the body couldn’t be thought. 
This functional complementarity doesn’t introduce a qualitative leap of the 
body to its thought. The mental state makes the body think whereas the 
living matter provides by the means of the body the thinking matter.
Mental autonomy is part of the logic of the living because the material 
conditions of the living produce the conditions of mental representations. 
The liberation of the cortex-brain and its speciﬁc hypertrophy allows the 
production of mental states.
The illusion of mental localization
The reason why not all neuroscientists will manage to localize the 
change of the quantitative into the qualitative is that the neurofunctional 
level of the mental state explains this change in its conditions but never in 
its contents, except in the case of lesions. The changing of a level of organi-
zation to another, whose quality seems heterogeneous in the previous level, 
can be measured at the time of the visualization of neuronal networks, of 
the intersynaptic communication of neurotransmitters (G. Edelman, 1987). 
But this measurement ﬁnds a cause-eﬀect relation between the organization 
of living matter and what would be its eﬀective result. Actually, a direct cau-
sality produces a mental state as its dysfunctioning disqualiﬁes the thought 
of the body. But the thought can’t be directly localized as it comes from a 
dynamic process.
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The reductionist illusion consists in ﬁxing this process in several stages 
or levels of material organization. Yet it is true that a certain level of orga-
nization of the matter is needed, below which the production of conscious 
thought is impossible. Thus nature, in its dynamic evolution, has not pro-
duced the same degree of organization. The distinction of nature between 
animal and man is superseded; it is now time we acknowledged a diﬀerence 
of degree in the organization of the matter. Anthropologists endeavoured 
to emphasize the role of the human body in the singularity of its mental 
activity. Without the release of the hand by bipedy and the growth of the 
brain volume, the interaction of the human body with surroundings wouldn’t 
have been able to create a sociocultural environment where education 
and speech ensured the classic transmission. The plasticity of ontogenesis 
made the socialization of the human body possible because cultural factors 
further collective integration and personal identiﬁcation. Animals can’t be 
compared to us except if we establish a functional hierarchy. Their bodies 
manage to deﬁne a very limited part of freedom even if the interaction with 
the environment, provided in their degree of plasticity by Nature, ensures 
a dynamic dimension. 
The speciﬁc diﬀerence of the human body is to become a thinking 
body: thinking doesn’t lie in a localizable part of the body because the body 
organizes itself, thinks itself in producing its level of mentalization that we 
separate in an abstract way by instituting it as thought. The humanization 
of the body requires a continuous interactive elaboration between environ-
ment and body.
Brain plasticity and body construction
 
From its conception onwards, the human body is a person thanks to 
the inﬂuences it receives from its environment. By isolating consciousness 
from body sensitivity, some would like to determine the movement of 
birth of human identity. Yet, even during the forming in utero, the fœtus 
(Lecanuet J.P., Fifer W.P., Krasnegor N.A., eds., 1995) feels and reacts to the 
food and aﬀects his mother receives (P. Rochat, 2001). When we count the 
age of a child from his birth, we forget stages already incorporated during 
intra-uterine life. The human body should be understood as soon as the 
germinal movement of its matter. 
The nervous system, as the base of sensitivity, ceases its activity only 
with cerebral death. The continuity, from the conception of the body to 
the destruction of its somato-psychic unity, renews the deﬁnition of per-
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sonal history. Being born incomplete and indeterminate, the human body 
has to incorporate the information coming from its environment. This 
incorporation consists in a progressive determination throughout learning. 
Genetic inheritance deﬁnes the structures and modes of the human body 
functions.
But the opposition between innate and acquired becomes meaningless 
when no potentiality becomes necessarily actual. The human body ﬁnds a 
form between personal identity and social existence. Plasticity of the brain 
structures makes it possible: it would be wrong to think eyes see immediately 
and naturally since David Hubel (1988) and his experiments with Torse 
Wiesel prove that it is the interaction of light with visual neurons which 
makes us see the world. Otherwise, the human body loses the capacity of 
sight it has potentially in itself.
Nothing is naturally acquired. Human nature has to experience the 
world in order to qualify (AQ). The neurobiology of development, a new 
version of “the man without qualities,” gives to the human subject the free-
dom of building itself up. But this construction turns out to be deﬁnitive: 
the initial plasticity loses its suppleness with the myelenisation of nervous 
ﬁbers (Spemann H., 1938) which preserves the information of successive 
incorporations.
Language learning is a good example of this preserving specialization. 
From intra-uterine life (Ph. Evrard, A. Minkowski, 1989), the human body 
hears sounds to which it reacts by movements at birth; its relatives speak 
to it in a language whose sound quality becomes more and more speciﬁc 
to the ear. Then language mastery (B. de Boysson-Bardies, S. de Schonen, 
P. Jusczyk, P. MacNeilage & J. Morton, eds., 1993) is reached with the in-
deﬁnite repetition of the babble in which syllables are associated together. 
Language, as conventional support between the signifying and the signiﬁed, 
will be recognized at the end of this specialization. Each child must lose 
an incredible linguistic potential when he becomes a French or an English 
speaker. As he doesn’t remain a polyglot, the human body can’t express itself 
without the language it kept on incorporating during the early years (J. 
Mehler, Bertoncini J., Barrière M. & Jassik-Gershenfeld D., 1978).
It would be futile to limit the forming of the human body only to 
the biological progress from childhood to adulthood. Throughout its life, 
the human body keeps having dynamic interactions with its environment. 
The quantitative development of the brain does not last more than the ﬁrst 
quarter of our biological life, yet the brain goes on receiving information 
from its body. This information creates new connections between the dif-
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ferent brain areas so that it increases the complexity of memory. Even if the 
clinical descriptions of lesions fail to identify all the mnesic contents, P. Broca 
taught us how much the state of the body determines the state of the brain 
and conversely. The brain incorporates what the body individualizes. This 
double movement of incorporation of the world and of individualization of 
the body can be understood only from a conception of living matter.
Incorporation and individuation
  
Any nervous lesion prevents the brain from using what it has incor-
porated. It causes a loss of identity as well as a functional imbalance. As a 
disease weakens the body, the neurofunctional lesion prevents the subject 
from exercising his cognitive autonomy. As long as the brain provides the 
body with the means of its individuation, the authority called subject gets 
the conditions of its exercise: then consciousness is freed thanks to the proper 
functioning of the brain.
However, contrary to what those who support the notion of neuronal 
man (J.-P. Changeux, 1983) think, the content of thought can’t be com-
pletely determined by the matter of its brain. We may refuse to consider 
the brain as the organ of thought, but we can’t separate thought from its 
neurophysiological conditions of activity. It would be a mistake to consider 
brain and consciousness as opposites, like matter and thought, and fail to 
see the embodied link which holds them together. The distinction between 
levels of functioning must not hide the representation and/or cause one to 
believe in the scattering of the body.
The human body has been scattered and reduced by the human sci-
ences which have studied it. The body gives its brain suﬃcient information 
to enable it to embody its representations and feelings, and derives its role 
as the main mediator as much from its phylogenesis as from its ontogenesis. 
With its phylogenesis, the body can genetically use specializations transmit-
ted since the beginning of human mind. The succession of species made our 
body better and better adapted to its surroundings. In the absence of instinct, 
technique had to provide the means of replacing natural surroundings by an 
environment. This evolution has freed the body from servitudes in making 
the cerebral organization complex enough to think this freeing. Nature has 
produced a species likely to become completely cultural, including as genetics 
and procreatics prove it in the production of its own body.
As far as ontogenesis is concerned, each human body is singular even if 
the individual shares the same genetic inheritance with the other members of 
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the species. The proteic synthesis of our genes is so peculiar that no individual 
is identical. Helped by these singularities, each human body incorporates 
every experience. So the ﬂesh of the human body could be deﬁned as the 
sum of all these experiences, forming many layers, networks and intertwin-
ings. The brain, being incorporated, can’t resist this subjective construction 
of the matter: it takes the form of its body (N. Le Douarin, 1982).
But during its construction, the brain in turn determines the body (D. 
Purves, 1988). This permanent retroaction provides a reciprocal limitation 
to the brain and to the body. So the ﬂesh of the body chooses its modes of 
constitution and its possibilities of incarnation. Incarnation is no longer the 
appearance of the mind in the matter but the expression in the body and 
by the body of its constituent layers. Either memory is stimulated by the 
presence of something known, or creative imagination is activated by the 
absence of something experienced. Our body, always present in the world 
by its senses, conceals a great number of signs to be discovered. Out of its 
prospect, this body is understood today as an indiﬀerent neutral matter. Yet 
the human body becomes such only if it manages to incorporate its history. 
We only know the outer world by means of our body.
The role of the body
During its construction, the brain, following the model of interaction 
rather than the internal model of emergence, deﬁnes its plasticity according 
to the cultural forms which determine the body. The brain has a singular 
ﬂesh for each human body. Even if the natural elements are determined 
by the genetic inheritance, the natural surroundings have to actualize and 
direct the plastic potentialities of the brain in construction. This singular 
development gives the human body the role of a determining, the transla-
tion of which will be eﬀective in the neurobiological data. Then the nervous 
messages would not be prior to the esthesiologic activity of the body. The 
brain is not the condition of the body. It would mean mixing up cause and 
eﬀect. There is no neurobiological basis to corporeal consciousness since as 
soon as intra-uterine life, it is the relation of the body with the world which 
informs, directs and selects the nervous networks and circuits. If the human 
being is born with an incomplete brain, it is precisely so that culture may be 
the necessary element of its qualiﬁcation. The neurobiology of development 
refuses to link the corporeal consciousness to the result of brain activity.
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The body is a mediator (R. Barbaras, 1999, 529-230) because it informs 
the brain about sensitive data, because it conveys the communications of the 
mind/brain, because it expresses a relational aﬀectivity with its sociocultural 
environment. The physiological or psychoaﬀective state of the body depends 
of course on hormones, on the quantities of active neuronal networks, on 
the quality of its genetic code. But the diﬀerence between an animal body 
and human body lies in the capacity of the latter to acquire learnings which 
modify the consciousness of itself. The link between the unconscious and 
memory is founded in the brain which records and reorganizes the represen-
tations in as many neuronal associations. Of course the dream is the warden 
of brain individuation but the historical involvement of a subject in the world 
is more than the deterministic result of endocrine hormones.
So the human body is a place of conversion: it means that its form 
retro-acts upon its matter. In the same way, its matter determines indeﬁ-
nitely its forming. So we must distinguish several subjective levels in order 
to understand, if not objectively explain, the modes of relations with the 
brain. Dualism as a real distinction of substances can’t subsist for it admits 
the relations only in intersection. A diﬀerence of degree is necessary, where 
each level corresponds to a level of representation for the human subject. 
So the unconscious is the subject’s intimate representation which can 
be modiﬁed by the brain/mind with psychoanalysis or because of physi-
ological damages. The human being’s brain/mind enables him to represent 
himself and develop representation by giving the thought a material support 
during the subject’s activity. The ﬂesh (D. Enns, 1995) is a dimension of 
aﬀectivity where feelings and imagination feed the subject’s experience in 
the singularity of its geohistory. The body proper is the image of the body, 
resulting from the narcissistic representation of the subject such as he sees 
himself or represents himself through others. The objective body is this exte-
rior body, visible surface for others, organism objectiﬁed by the mechanisms 
of techno-science (H.L. Dreyfus, 2000). The world is not in front of the 
subject because the subject is a being in the world.
The consciousness of the brain
The dualistic tradition has always supported the opposition between 
mind and body: as the seat of thought, the mind had to maintain the com-
munication with the world to ﬁnd a meaning. Except for this allotted role, 
the body was not important: even the passions of the soul found in animal 
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minds a mechanically determined matter. So the brain couldn’t be under-
stood otherwise than as an organ of the body. Descartes, who discovered the 
cogito, granted the brain the pineal gland in order to maintain the minimum 
communication between body and mind. The failure of subjective idealism is 
due to the substantial isolation of the res cogitans. And Denis Kambouchner 
(1995) shows that Descartes, in his 1649 treatise The Passions of the Soul, 
had to grant the body not only the determinism of animal but also modes 
of series of objective and functional operations.
Though medical description has found in biology its means of objec-
tifying the body, it would be ignorant to believe in functional monotypy. 
The biology of development takes the relational modes of the human body 
so much into account that it considers interaction as a structuration mode 
by incorporation. Thus, though not completely subjective, as Michel Henry 
(1999) thinks, the human body biopsychologically builds its ﬂesh. Each body 
is this historical ﬂesh, whose etiology has been embodied and shaped by the 
interaction with environment. By its character yet to be determined rather 
than undetermined, the human body contains all its history at the end of 
life. If its matter is marked with traces, scars and symptoms, the exhaustion 
of the ﬂesh is nevertheless translated into the modes of symbolic expression. 
As Jean-Louis Chrétien (1990) shows, tiredness, as ontological condition of 
embodied being, comes from the indeﬁnite gap between the human body 
and its ﬂesh, a gap so wide it can never be ﬁlled.
Yet the fault of this mechanical model is the lack of mutual determina-
tion of mind and body. The birth of biology at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century put natural surroundings in between: the surroundings have 
become the environment in which the body has to develop. Rather than 
deﬁned as a creature, the human body must build itself in a double way: on 
the one hand, it is a natural product ﬁnding in physical development the 
means of acquiring a consciousness of itself, and on the other hand it is a 
cultural result incorporating all the information from its environment and 
thus increasing its degree of consciousness. The human body can’t remain 
indiﬀerent to this double determination.
Consciousness can’t be completely separated from the brain (D.C. 
Dennett, 1991) because the human body builds cerebral connections in 
establishing the sensitive qualities of information which will be coded by 
the brain. The brain’s organization in two hemispheres, presented by many 
as a split brain, doesn’t eliminate the unity of consciousness. Through the 
studies of lesions of the callous body linking up the two hemispheres, split 
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brain specialists have shown how much this cognitive lateralization owed to 
neurofunctional specialization. The wish to explain consciousness rather than 
describe its activity derives its legitimacy from the progress of the neurosci-
ences. For this purpose, however, consciousness should have to be reduced 
to its neurobiological conditions, since the slightest failure modiﬁes the 
state of consciousness. And here is the main logical fault of this argument: 
from the clinical acknowledgement of the link between lesion and state of 
consciousness, one induces the necessary connection between brain and 
matter, thus disqualifying consciousness. Memory would be a succession of 
engrammes and programmes, perception would come to neuronal networks 
of vision, imagination would have to create new networks, and desire would 
ﬁnd its modes of regulation in the hormonal system. 
To cope with this drifting, cognitive scientists have been tempted to 
keep mental states of consciousness apart from neurobiological states of the 
brain, which may be a temporary solution. For supporters of cognitivism, 
mental states describe consciousness’ activities enough to be the speciﬁcally 
human level. This new humanism has however ignored the neurosciences, 
renewing the phenomenological reﬂection on consciousness. Neurophi-
losophers took advantage of this isolation to develop with hardly any real 
opposition, a cerebral deﬁnition of consciousness. The alternative between 
cognitivists and neurophilosophers isn’t based on a debate but on the mutual 
exclusion of points of view. Then how can we give the brain the material 
principles of consciousness while acknowledging that the latter has its own 
level of activity? This research, which can only be worked out in a dynamic 
conception of matter, doesn’t really aim at what is scientiﬁcally correct but 
at the description of the diﬀerent levels of human embodiment.
Though I grant that corporeal matter is the seat of the complex dif-
ferentiation of these levels, I feel that we must recognize that the brain has 
a determining importance in the activity of consciousness. As all human 
brains are the product of body/environment interaction (S. Todes, 2001), 
consciousness then produced will be able to incarnate the incorporated neu-
ronal networks. But this incarnation, the successive layers of which amount 
to its phenomenology, is an autonomous ﬁeld in which consciousness carries 
on its subjective activity. The objective determination of the incorporated 
brain remains inﬂuential through the quality of mental images according 
to the variability of its neuronal networks. 
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Conclusion: The interactionist thesis
This change from the brain of consciousness, which makes it relative, 
to consciousness of the brain, which makes it believe in its subjective inde-
pendence, proves how much brain and consciousness are complementary. 
As brain of consciousness, the incorporated brain provides information 
and ways to become conscious. Then this develops the consciousness of the 
brain by determining the brain in order to achieve the cognitive command 
of the thought:
Thought
autonomy of consciousness
Brain of Consciousness — Consciousness of the Brain
Incorporated brain
Body in the world
Environment
This dialectical movement from the brain of consciousness to the con-
sciousness of the brain doesn’t prevent consciousness from operating its own 
reﬂection: the process of thought. Thought is diﬀerent from the conscious-
ness of the brain due to its functional autonomy: the mental state is able to 
have a singular activity whereas the consciousness of the brain orders the 
brain to fulﬁll the orders of the will. With the consciousness of the brain, the 
human body reﬂexively thinks itself, thereby forgetting the relative autonomy 
of the thinking consciousness from the brain of consciousness.
Thought turns real autonomy into a subjective independence, producing 
mental states such as dreaming, imagination, ideation, representation and 
intentionality. From the subject’s point of view, his thought is free because 
he can no longer see the determinism of the brain of consciousness. His 
power on the body, through the means of the consciousness of the brain, 
holds him in the illusion of his spiritual power on the matter. But from the 
point of view of this matter, the modiﬁcation of its states can always limit 
the exercise of this freedom. 
Human thought is produced by human bodies, but thought believes 
in its freedom because of the natural illusion of forgetting its relative 
autonomy. Yet this illusion has a real power over the body. Reducing 
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thought and brain, neurophilosophy has chosen to deny this essentially 
human level of consciousness to institute a determinism where there is 
nothing but determination.
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